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INTRODUCTION 
Current nondestructive evaluation techniques generally do not 
produce identical indications when applied to flaws of the same 
length. The chance of detecting a given crack length depends on 
many factors, such as the location, orientation and shape of the 
flaw, materials, inspectors, inspection environments, etc. As a 
result, the probability of detection (POD) for all cracks of a given 
length has been used in the literature to define the capability of 
a particular NDE system in a given environment. Some POD curves are 
shown in Fig. 1 for various laboratory inspection techniques. Many 
other POD curves can be found, for instance, in Refs. 1-3. 
In practical applications, a nondestructive inspection limit, 
aNDE, is chosen, which is a crack length that usually corresponds 
to a high detection probability and a high confidence level. For 
instance, the damage tolerant specification [4, 5] requires that 
aNDE should be the crack length associated with a 90% detection prob-
ability and 95% confidence level. The fracture mechanics residual 
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life, Nf , is the life for the crack length aNDE to propagate to the 
critical crack length ac under expected usage environments as shown 
in Fig. 2(a). The return to service interval, denoted by NR is 
equal to Nf divided by a safety factor Sf' i.e., NR=Nf/S f • If no 
crack is detected during inspection, the component is returned to 
service and the crack length in that component is reset to be equal 
to aNDE as shown in Fig. 2(b). Hence the inspection limit aNDE is 
also referred to as the reset crack length. In the damage tolerant 
analysis, a safety factor of 2.0 has been used. 
It follows from Fig. 1 that the NDE reliability consists of 
two types of wrong indications; (i) failure to give a positive 
indication in the presence of a crack whose length is greater than 
aNDE' referred to as Type I error, and (ii) given a positive indi-
cation when the crack length is smaller than aNDE' referred to as 
Type II error. For safety critical components in airframe struc-
tures, Type I error is of primary concern. In the Retirement-For-
Cause (RFC) analysis of gas turbine engine components, however, both 
Type I and Type II errors are important, because the criterion used 
in RFC analyses is the minimization of the life cycle cost (LCC) 
for engine components [e.g., 6-7]. As a result, the reduction for 
both types of error is one of the main objectives of the present 
study. 
The Type I error allows the components containing a crack 
length longer than aNDE to return to service, thus greatly increasing 
the potential safety hazard. For a given NDE system the Type I error 
can be made as small as possible by choosing a large value for the 
inspection limit aNDE' However, as the value of aNDE increases the 
return to service interval NR reduces thus increasing the frequency 
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Fig. 1. POD curves for various NDE systems. 
IMPROVING NDE THROUGH MULTIPLE INSPECTIONS 
FRACTURE 
CRITICAL 
" 
J: 
l-
e:> 
z 
UI 
.J 
:.:: 
u 
<l 
II: 
U 
" 
J: 
G 
z 
UI 
.J 
0NDE INSPECTION LIMIT 
--------------
0, 
¥ ./ 0 
CRACK INITIATION I. TOTAL FATIGUE LIFE 
CRITICAL 
REI NSPECT (NO CRACK.,.' 
RETURN TO SERVICE~ 
FRACTURE 
MECHANICS 
RESIDUAL 
LIFE Nf 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I / I 
I / 
TO- SERVI CE / ,../ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
:.:: 
u 
<l 
II: 
u 
INTERVALS >-'_ 
NDE ~ / CRACK FOUND, 
LIMIT _I_I_~ ..... "" RETIRE DISK 
NR NR NR 
CYCLES (TIME) 
71 
CYCLES, 
\TIME) 
Fig. 2. Fracture mechanics residual life Nf and return to service 
interval NR• 
or cost of inspections. Moreover, while the Type I error can be 
reduced by increasing the value of aNDE' the Type II error increases 
accordingly as shown in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b). 
The type II error rejects good components and hence has an 
adverse effect on the cost of replacement and the life cycle cost. 
For a given NDE system with a single inspection, it is impossible 
to reduce the Type II error without increasing the Type I error and 
vice versa. It is obvious then that the ideal inspection capability 
of an NDE system is a unit step function as shown in Fig. 3(c), in 
which both Type I and Type II errors are zero. Unfortunately, such 
an ideal NDE system may be far from reality. 
There are situations where the critical crack size is small, 
such that the required aNDE value with high levels of detection 
probability and confidence may not be achieved by an NDE system. 
It is also conceivable that a given NDE system at depot level may 
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and (c) ideal NDE system. 
not be able to reduce the life cycle cost such that it may be more 
economical to just replace the components at overhaul without 
inspections. In order to circumvent those difficulties, possible 
applications of multiple inspections are studied herein. 
The POD curve of an NDE system applies to the inspection of a 
critical location only. For an engine disk containing a large 
number of critical locations to be inspected, including bolt holes, 
cooling holes, rim holes, etc., the inspection reliability for a 
disk differs significantly from that for a hole, because a disk is 
retired if at least one hole is rejected by the NDE system. Appli-
cations of the present results to the inspection reliability of 
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engine disks were documented in Ref. 8 as will be discussed later. 
The objectives of this paper are (i) to formulate and derive 
mathematically the resulting POD curve for components under multiple 
inspections, (ii) to investigate quantitatively the potential benefit 
of multiple inspection procedures, (iii) to establish the direction 
in which the capability of an NDE system should be improved, and 
(iv) to establish the strategy and sequence for multiple inspections 
in order to reduce either Type I error or Type II error or both. 
Examples are given to demonstrate the proposed multiple inspection 
approach. Applications of the present approach to the Retirement-
For-Cause of gas turbine engine disks are also discussed. 
THEORY OF MULTIPLE INSPECTIONS 
In the literature, the POD curve for a particular NDE system 
has been established from repeated inspection data in which the 
inspector mayor may not be the same. Then the inspection data set 
is analyzed using either the Binomial method [e.g., 2-3] or the 
method of regression analysis [9]. It should be emphasized, however, 
that both Binomial and regression methods assume explicitly that the 
result of each inspection using the same NDE system (whether the same 
inspector or not) is statistically independent of the other (i.e., 
independent sampling), Thus all the POD curves available in the 
literature are based on the premise that the results of mUltiple 
inspections with the same NDE system are statistically independent. 
Such an assumption may be subject to criticisms. However, in order 
to be consistent with current practice and to use available POD 
curves, the assumption will be employed first in the following for-
mulation. The mathematical formulation in which the results of 
multiple inspections are not statistically independent is given in 
Appendix I. The issue of dependent and independent multiple 
inspections along with the application to engine or structural 
components will be discussed later. 
The formulation and solution will be established in an appro-
priate perspective for multiple inspections. With the mathematical 
solution put into appropriate setting, one can manipulate various 
NDE capabilities (or POD curves) to achieve a most economical 
multiple inspection system in terms of Type I error, Type II error 
and both. 
Let the following POD curves associated with m inspection 
systems be given; 
POD(a;l) = probability of detecting the crack length, a, 
under No. 1 NDE system; 
POD(a;j) probability of detecting the crack length, a, 
under No. j NDE system; j:=1,2, ••• ,m. 
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In general, POD(a;i) is different from POD(a;j). However, they 
may also be identical as a special case. Two basic inspection rules 
and their combinations are described in the following; 
Union Rule 
A component (or a critical location) is rejected if it is re-
jected by either one of the NDE systems employed as shown in Fig. 4. 
Let POD(a;lU2) = probability that the crack length, a, is 
detected by either No. 1 NDE system or No. 2 NDE system or both. 
Then, based on the assumption that the inspections by both NDE 
systems are statistically independent, the resulting POD curve for 
the component is given by 
POD(a;lU2) = 1 - [1-POD(a;1)][1-POD(a;2)] (1) 
or 
POD(a;lU2) = POD(a;l) + POD(a;2) - POD(a;1)POD(a;2) (2) 
In a similar fashion, the probability of detection (POD) under m NDE 
m 
systems, denoted by P(a;.U j) is obtained as 
J=l 
m 
POD(a; U j) = 1 -
j=l 
IT! 
IT [l-POD(a;j)] 
j=l 
(3) 
In general, the application of multiple inspections using the 
union rule will reduce the Type I error and the inspection limit 
aNDE' thus improving the structural safety and reliability. However, 
it may also increase the Type II error; the extent of which depends 
on the particular functional form of POD(a;j); j=1,2, ••• ,m. An 
exceptional case is that if POD(a;2) has a lower bound at aNDE' i.e., 
POD(a;2) is equal to zero for a~aNDE' then there is no increase in 
the Type II error under two inspections. A schematical flow chart 
for the inspection procedures using two NDE systems and the union 
rule is shown in Fig. 5. 
POD(o;!) POD(o.2} POD{o.1) POD {o.2} 
f/IIIJ ~ 
UNION RULE INTERSECTION RULE 
Fig. 4. Rejected components shown in shaded areas. 
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Fig. 5. Inspection procedure for two NDE systems with union rule. 
Intersection Rule 
A component (or a critical location) is rejected if and only 
if it is rejected by all the NDE systems employed as shown in Fig. 4. 
If POD(a;lil2) denotes the probability of detecting the crack 
length, a, by both No. I and No.2 NDE systems, then we have 
POD(a;lil2) = POD(a;I)POD(a;2) (4) 
In a similar manner, the probability of detecting the crack length, 
a, by everyone of m NDE systems employed is given by 
m 
POD(a; il j) 
j=l 
m 
IT POD(a;j) 
j=l 
(5) 
In general, the application of multiple inspections using the 
intersection rule alone will degrade the NDE capability. It is 
precisely due to such a property that the Type II error can be 
reduced. However, caution should be taken such that the degradation 
for the Type I error will be-insignificant. For instance, using 
two inspection systems the condition for not having a serious adverse 
effect on the Type I error is that POD(a;2) should be very close to 
unity at a=aNDE as will be described later. If POD(a;2) has an upper 
bound at aNDE, i.e., POD(a;2)=1 for a~aNDE' then the Type I error 
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will not be effected. A flow chart for the inspection procedure 
using two NDE systems and the intersection rule is shown in Fig. 6. 
Combination Rule for Three Inspections 
As described previously, the application of either the union 
rule or the intersection rule alone can not reduce both Type I and 
Type II errors simultaneously. However, a combined use of both union 
and intersection rules along with an appropriate choice of POD(a;3) 
can result in a simultaneous improvement for both types of error. 
Because of practical limitations, such as the facility and inspection 
cost, we shall describe only a possible combination of union and 
intersection rules using three inspections as follows. 
Let POD[a;(lU2)G3] be the probability of detecting the crack 
length, a, under three inspections, where the union rule is applied 
to No. 1 and No. 2 NDE systems and the intersection rule is employed 
for the No. 3 NDE system. The resulting POD curve from the applica-
tion of No . 1 and No.2 NDE systems, POD(a ; lU2), is given by Eq. 2. 
Hence, it follows from Eq. 4 that 
POD[a;(lU2)G3] = POD(a ; 3)POD(a;lU2) 
Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 6, one obtains 
POD[a;(lU2)G3] = POD(a ; 3) [POD(a;l) + POD(a ; 2) 
- POD(a;1)POD(a;2)] 
COMPONENTS 
=> 
REJECTED 
COMPONENTS 
(6) 
(7) 
Fig. 6. Inspection procedure for two NDE systems with intersection 
rule . 
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intersection rule. 
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The inspection procedure for three NDE systems presented in Eq. 
7 is shown by a flow chart in Fig. 7 and explained as follows. 
After the first inspection by the No.1 NDE system, components are 
divided into two populations: an accepted one and a rejected one. 
The accepted population is further inspected by the No. 2 NDE system 
(to reduce Type I error) and the accepted components are returned to 
service. The components rejected by the No. 2 NDE system along with 
the components rejected by the No. 1 NDE system are then inspected 
by the No.3 NDE system (to reduce Type II error). Then the rejected 
components (by No. 3 NDE system) are replaced or repaired and the 
accepted components are returned to service. It should be mentioned 
that POD(a;3) for the third NDE system should be very close to 1.0 
(such as 0.99) at a=aNDE so that the adverse effect on the Type I 
error is minimal. Likewise, the bandwidth of POD(a;3) should be as 
narrow as possible in order to reduce the Type II error effectively. 
Inspections using such an NDE system may be expensive and time 
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consuming, but the number of components to be inspected by the No. 3 
NDE system may be small. This will be discussed later. 
If m NDE systems are employed, then there are many different 
combinations of union and intersection rules that can be investi-
gated. However, the basic mathematical approach to derive the 
resulting POD curve is the same as that described previously. For 
instance, for a special case in which POD(a;1)=POD(a;2)=POD(a;3), 
then the resulting POD curve using the union rule is given by 
3 
POD(a; U j) 
j=l 
3 1 - [l-POD(a;l)] (8) 
When the fourth NDE system with POD(a;4) is further applied to 
inspect those rejected components using the intersection rule, the 
resulting POD curve is given by 
3 
POD [ a; ( U j) il4 ] 
j=l 
3 
3 
POD(a;4)POD(a; U j) 
j=l 
in which POD(a; U j) is given by Eq. 8. j=l 
Inspection Sequence for Minimum Number and Cost of Inspections 
(9) 
The resulting POD curves under multiple inspections derived in 
the previous sections are independent of the sequence (or order) of 
applications of multiple NDE systems. However, the number of in-
spections required for components and hence the cost of inspection 
is indeed influenced by the sequence of inspections. For the case 
of two inspections with the union rule as shown in Fig. 5, POD(a;l) 
should be better than POD(a;2) such that fewer components will be 
accepted by the No. 1 NDE system. Hence the number of components to 
be inspected by the No. 2 NDE system is minimal. In general, for 
multiple inspections with the union rule, the NDE system with the 
highest resolution capability should be applied first in order to 
minimize the subsequent number of inspections. However the minimi-
zation of the number of inspections implies the minimization of the 
inspection cost only when the cost per inspection for both No. 1 and 
No. 2 NDE systems is almost the same. If there is a difference in 
the inspection cost for two NDE systems, then the system with the 
lower inspection cost should be the No. 1 NDE system. This is 
because the No.1 NDE system has to inspect all the components, 
whereas only those components accepted by the No. 1 NDE system will 
be inspected by the No. 2 NDE system. 
On the other hand, for the case of two inspections using the 
intersection rule as shown in Fig. 6, POD(a;2) should be better 
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than POD(a;l), so that the number of components rejected by the No.1 
system, which should be inspected by the No. 2 NDE system, will be 
minimal. For the case of three inspections using the union-
intersection rule, the number of components to be inspected by the 
No. 3 NDE system is independent of the inspection sequence. However, 
for the first two inspections using the union rule, POD(a;l) should 
be better than POD(a;2) in order to achieve a minimum number of 
inspections. 
Again, depending on the cost of inspection for each NDE system, 
the rationale described previously can be applied to minimize the 
inspection cost. 
Correlated Multiple Inspections 
The solutions obtained above for the resulting POD curves under 
multiple inspection procedures are based on the assumption that 
inspection results from multiple NDE systems are statistically in-
dependent. This assumption is consistent with the current practice 
for establishing the POD curve for each NDE system in which indepen-
dent sampling has been assumed, i.e., each inspection result is 
assumed to be statistically independent. 
It is more economical to perform multiple inspections using the 
same NDE system. However, the question of whether the results of 
multiple inspections usipg the same NDE system but under different 
inspection conditions will be independent or correlated has not yet 
been fully resolved. Take eddy-current inspection for instance. The 
following conditions may be different in multiple inspections; 
inspector, gain of NDE signal, scanning speed for inspection, position 
of probe, signal data processing, surface preparation of inspected 
parts, loading condition of parts, the same system at different 
locations or facilities, etc. 
For a fully automated NDE system currently under development for 
the RFC system, it is anticipated that the error or uncertainty due 
to human operation and others will be greatly reduced, and the 
systematic error or uncertainty of the NDE system itself will pre-
vail. Thus multiple inspections using such a fully automated NDE 
system alone for a single location may be highly correlated if the 
preparation for the surface condition of the location is identical. 
The mathematical solutions for correlated inspections are pre-
sented in Appendix I. With correlated inspection systems, however, 
additional POD information is needed. For instance, the conditional 
probability of detecting the crack length, a, by the No. I NDE system 
under the condition that the crack has been detected by the No.2 
NDE system is required. 
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Application of Independent Inspections 
One of the motivations of the present investigation is its 
application to the Retirement-For-Cause of gas turbine engine com-
ponents, such as disks. A disk usually contains many holes, such 
as bolt holes, cooling holes and rim holes, in which cracks may occur. 
Since the crack in each hole may have a different length, orientation 
and geometry, the inspection of one hole can be assumed to be 
statistically independent of the inspection of another hole. Like-
wise, in order to reduce Type II error, the rejected holes may be 
cleaned, polished or even replicated, in which case a high resolution 
capability for the POD curve can be achieved. It is reasonable to 
assume that the inspection for a hole with replication is statisti-
cally independent of the inspection for the same hole without repli-
cation even when the same NDE system is used. The application of 
the present results to RFC of engine components is presented in 
Reference 8. 
Type I and Type II Errors 
The effect of multiple inspections on the POD curve, Type I and 
Type II errors, and the inspection limit aNDE will be demonstrated 
later. While the capability of a particular NDE system is defined 
by its POD curve, the Type I and Type II errors depend not only on 
the POD curve itself but also on the preinspection distribution of 
the flaw length in the component. For instance, if all the crack 
lengths in the component prior to inspection are smaller than aNDE' 
then the Type I error is zero. 
Let F(a) and f(a) be the distribution function and the proba-
bility density function, respectively, of the flaw length in the 
component prior to inspection. Then the Type I and Type II errors, 
denoted by PI and PII , respectively, are given by 
00 
PI = I f(x)[l-POD(x)]dx (10) 
aNDE 
in which 
aNDE I f(x)POD(x)dx 
o 
(11) 
probability of missing (or accepting) a crack length 
longer than aNDE , 
PII probability of detecting (or rejecting) a crack length 
smaller than aNDE , 
and POD (a) is the POD curve of a particular NDE system. 
Both PI and PII given by Eqs. 10 and 11 are the quantitative 
measures of Type I and Type II errors. Two qualitative measures of 
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Type I and Type II errors which depend exclusively on the POD curve 
may also be appealing, 
00 
AI = J [l-POD(x)]dx 
aNDE 
(12) 
aNDE 
All = J POD(x)dx 
o 
(13) 
It is apparent from Eqs. 12 and 13 that AI is the area above the POD 
curve from aNDE to infinity and All is the area under the POD curve 
from zero to aNDE' as shown in the shaded areas of Fig. 3. While AI 
and All are not the quantitative measures of Type I and Type II 
errors, they may serve for qualitative comparisons between the capa-
bility of various NDE systems when the value of the inspection limit 
aNDE is fixed. 
When multiple inspections are employed, the POD (a) function 
appearing in Eqs. 10-13 represents the resulting POD curve derived 
in Eqs. 1-9. Hence it should be replaced by the appropriately 
corresponding POD curve resulting from multiple inspections. 
Distribution of Preinspection Flaw Length 
Theoretically, the distribution of the flaw length for a com-
ponent prior to inspection can be derived from the distributions of 
(i) time to crack initiation (or equivalent initial flaw length), 
(ii) crack growth rate in service, and (iii) service loads. Such 
an approach, however, is very complex. From the NDE standpoint, it 
is reasonable to assume the Weibull distribution for the preinspection 
flaw length for illustrative purposes. Available information on the 
statistical variabilities of the equivalent initial flaw length, the 
crack propagation rate and the service loads for engine disks indi-
cates that the statistical dispersion (coefficient of variation) of 
the crack length in service is of the order of 100%. The Weibull 
distribut.ion with a 100% coefficient of variation degenerates into a 
special case of the negative exponential distribution. As a result, 
the distribution of the preinspection flaw length will be assumed to 
follow the negative exponential distribution in the present study, 
i.e., 
f(a) 
F(a) 
Ae-Aa 
1 -Aa 
- e 
a>O 
(14) 
a>O 
in which f(a) and F(a) are, respectively, the probability density 
function and the distribution function of the preinspection flaw 
length. In Eq. 14, l/A represents the average flaw length. 
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NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
Eddy current inspection data for fastener holes in skin and 
stringer wing assembly, referred to as HAVE CRACK, were available in 
Ref . 3 and analyzed by the Binomial method. The same data set was 
further analyzed in Ref. 9 using the regression method with the 
assumed functional form for the POD curve as follows; 
exp(a + S£na) 
POD(a;l) = 1 + exp(a + S£na) (15) 
in which a=-2.9 and S=1.7 [see Fig. 8]. This POD curve is replotted 
in Fig. 9(a) as Curve 1 . The crack length associated with 90% and 
96% detection probabilities are, respectively, 20 . 05 mm and 35 . 7 mm . 
The data set used to establish the POD curve was generated using 
the same cracked specimens but inspected by different inspectors and 
NDE systems at different locations. If the components are inspected 
twice at different locations, i.e., POD(a;1)=POD(a;2), the resulting 
POD curve, i . e . , POD(a;lU2), with the union rule is shown as Curve 2 
(Eq . 2) in Fig. 9(a) . One can further improve the Type I error by 
performing a third inspection using the union rule . With POD(a;l)= 
POD(a;2)=POD(a;3) the resulting POD(a;lU2U3), Eq. 3, is displayed in 
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Fig. 9(a) as Curve 3. If the inspection limit, aNDE' is required to 
be 12.4 mm, i.e., aNDE=12.4 mm, then, AI and All (Eqs. 12 and 13) are 
computed and shown in Table 1. It is observed from Table 1 that AI 
reduces and All increases as the number of inspections increases. 
The distribution of the flaw length prior to inspection is given 
by Eq. 14 in which the average flaw length is assumed to be 5 rnrn, 
i.e., A=O.2/rnrn. The probability density function given by Eq. 14 is 
displayed in Fig. 9(a) as a dashed curve. With such a preinspection 
flaw length distribution, the probability that the crack length will 
exceed aNDE=12.4 rnrn is 8.37%, i.e., on the average there are 8.37% 
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Fig. 9. Resulting POD curves under multiple inspections. (a) Union 
rule, and (b) union-intersection rule. 
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of the components that will have a crack length longer than 12.4 rom. 
Hence the average percentage of good components, PG, prior to 
inspection is 91.63%, i.e., PG=91.63%. 
The Type I and Type II errors, PI and PII , are computed from 
Eqs. 10 and 11 in which POD(x) is replaced by POD(x;l), POD(x;lU2) 
and POD(x;lU2U3), respectively. The results are shown in Table 1. 
It is observed from Table 1 that the Type I error reduces drastically 
as the number of inspections with the union rule increases. However, 
the Type II error increases simultaneously. 
To reduce the Type II error, an additional inspection with a 
high resolution capability is used in conjunction with the inter-
section rule. For illustrative purposes, the POD curve of the NDE 
system for the additional inspection using the intersection rule is 
assumed to resemble that of the x-ray system shown in Fig. 1, i.e., 
POD(a;3*) o 
a-9.6 
= --z.-s 
for a<9.6 rom 
for 9.6<a<12.4 
1 for a>12.4 rom 
(16, 
It is obvious that the POD curve given above is a straight line 
between 9.6 rom and 12.4 rom (see Fig. 1). 
The resulting POD curve, denoted by POD[a;(lU2)n3*] and 
POD[a;(lU2U3)n3*], are presented in Fig. 9(b) as solid and dashed 
curves, respectively. Note that POD[a;(lU~n3*] is the resulting 
POD curve under two inspections with the union rule, i.e., POD(a;l)= 
POD(a;2), as well as the third inspection with the POD curve given 
by Eq. 16. Likewise POD[a;(lU2U3)n3*] is the resulting POD curve 
under three inspections with the union rule and an additional in-
spection with the intersection rule where the POD curve is given by 
Eq. 16. Both POD[a;(lU2)n3*] and POD[a;(lU2U3)n3*] are computed 
from Eqs. 7 and 9, respectively. 
Table 1. Type I and Type II Errors; aNDE = 12:4 rom, PG = 91.63% 
No. of Type AI An PI Pn Inspections (mm) (mm) 
1 POD(a;l) 2.50 5.99 1.l5xlO -2 28.6% 
0.24 8.30 -3 42.7% 2 POD(a;lU2) 1. 72xlO 
POD[a;(lU2)n3*] 0.24 1.10 -3 5.9% 3 1. 72xlO 
9.36 -4 50.8% 3 POD(a;lU2U3) 0.03 2. 74xlO 
1.38 -4 6.2% 4 POD[a;(lU2U3)ll3*] 0.03 2.74xlO 
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The Type I and Type II errors, PI and PII , as well as AI and All 
are computed from Eqs. 10-13 and the results are shown in Table 1. 
It is observed from Table 1 and Fig. 9(b) that multiple inspections 
can reduce both Type I and Type II errors simultaneously. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An exploratory study has been made of the possible application 
of multiple inspection procedures and its potential pay-offs. The 
solutions are obtained for both independent NDE systems and dependent 
NDE systems. The resulting POD curve under multiple inspections is 
derived quantitatively from the POD curves of individual NDE systems 
when the union rule, the intersection rule and the combination thereof 
are used. Thus, researchers and practicing engineers can play with 
different combinations of NDE systems and procedures to arrive at an 
optimum strategy for their particular purpose. 
Numerical examples are given using available POD curves from 
certain NDE systems to illustrate the basic idea and the application 
of multiple inspection strategy. It is shown that multiple inspec-
tions using the union rule alone, in general, reduce Type I error 
but increase Type II error, and the effect is reversed if the inter-
section rule is employed alone. It is further shown that both Type 
I and Type II errors can be simultaneously reduced significantly by 
the combined use of union and intersection rules. However, caution 
should be exercised in selecting the third NDE system (or POD curve) 
in order to minimize possible adverse effects. The sequence of 
inspections to minimize the inspection cost has also been discussed. 
For gas turbine engine components, such as disks, inspections 
are performed for each critical location, including bolt holes, 
cooling holes, rim holes, etc. A disk which consists of a large 
number of holes is normally retired if at least one hole is rejected 
by the NDE system. The POD curve for anyone particular NDE system 
as well as the resulting POD curve under multiple inspections pre-
sented herein applies to one hole only. Thus the POD curve for a 
disk containing a large number of holes differs significantly from 
that of the NDE system. With the multiple inspection theory developed 
herein, an exploratory study has been made [Ref. 8] for the inspec-
tion reliability of engine disks containing many holes. The signi-
ficant advantage of multiple inspections for engine disks has been 
demonstrated in Ref. 8. 
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DISCUSSION 
S. Bush (Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratory): This is a very 
powerful tool, but to put it in perspective, what you will see on 
multiple inspections is that you mayor may not affect your type 2 
error, but you never do as well as you think you will on type 1 
errors. To cite an example: for three inspections, three differ-
ent sets of equipment on the same samples, only 32% found all of 
the flaws. When I say all of the flaws I mean that there was a 
common finding of the flaw, and that means that a very high per-
centage of them did not find it. This is an inherent problem in 
almost every inspection mode that you get into. 
J.N. Yang (Wright-Patterson AFB): Depending on different sets of 
rules; if you use your union rule, then you will reduce the type 1 
error. 
S. Bush: You are right. Your union intersection combination would 
obviously resolve the problem with correct projection. 
J.N. Yang: Right. 
S. Bush: That simply indicates there are basic limitations even in 
the multiple approach. 
J.N. Yang: Yes. 
C.A. Rau (Failure Analysis Associates): Depending on the cause of 
the type 2 errors in the automated system, the type 2 error might 
go away just in reinspecting the same part. I think just re-
inspecting with the automated system, which may be a lot less ex-
pensive than a whole other system, may markedly reduce the type 2 
errors. 
J. N. Yang: In this paper we said we use different NDE systems. 
Actually, one of the special cases is that you use a certain NDE 
system. That's why in one of the viewgraphs we said we prefer to 
use a single NDE system which is a special case of our mathemati-
cal solution. We will work together with Mr. Rummel to analyze 
the independence and dependence situation when we use the same in-
spection system. 
C.A. Rau: I just want to follow up very briefly. The key point is 
that, if you think in terms of a bolt hole. the fact that you got 
a false call in one does not mean that the whole bolt hole is de-
fective. If you require that the false call come from precisely 
the same geometric position, you will find a combination of type 
2's of bolt holes will go way down compared to just looking at the 
redundant probability of a false indication in the entire bolt 
hole. 
